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ABSTRACT 
The United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, India, Russian 
Federation, Turkey, and China have all implemented policies to obtain reliable 
energy at reasonable prices. Overall, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the 
situations in which Turkey has encountered usage of energy as a “weapon” and 
to analyze Turkey’s reaction in these situations from 1945 until the present day.  
This thesis will then seek to predict the effects of energy issues on Turkey’s 
national security strategy. The thesis finds that Turkey passed through a 
preparation phase during the 1960s and 1980s to balance her approach to both 
buyers and sellers.  This period paved the way for the 1990s, when Turkey 
developed prospects for future energy supplies. Three general lessons emerge 
from an examination of Turkey’s experience: (1) Turkey managed to balance her 
energy market by pursuing successful compromise policies, (2) domestic needs, 
rather than transit fees and international concerns, have an essential role in 
forming these policies, and (3) even though tanker wars harm Turkey’s naval 
transportation, they are beneficial for Turkey’s land transportation as the only 
outlet for both of her neighbor producer countries. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis addresses energy security in the Middle East (ME) region. It 
specifically analyzes European Turkey’s energy outlook in the 21st century 
through the lens of the “militarization of energy security”1 hypothesis. Some 
scholars believe that conflicts between developed countries over energy supplies 
could re-emerge as a source of global instability. The major focus of this thesis is 
how to achieve a compromise between Turkey’s interests and the conditions 
under which energy could be used for political leverage. These conditions include 
energy disputes between Turkey and her neighbors, and conflicts in the ME. 
While Turkey did not participate in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988, Turkey was 
faced with Russia-Georgia War in 2008 and several prior gas disputes with Iran. 
Overall, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the situations in which Turkey has 
encountered the usage of energy as a “weapon”2 and to analyze Turkey’s 
reaction in these situations from 1945 until the present day.  This thesis will then 
seek to predict the effects of energy issues on Turkey’s national security 
strategy. 
What possible energy security challenges and opportunities might Turkey 
encounter in the 21st century warfare within its territory? Is there any historical 
evidence that Turkey has been involved in situations where energy has been 
used as a political tool? To answer the major research question, a historical case 
study of Turkey and her relations with her neighbors since 1945 will be 
conducted to determine to what extent energy concerns and security were the 
                                            
1 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., Energy Security and Global Politics:The 
Militarization of Resource Management (Routledge: Global Security Studies Taylor & Francis, 
2008). 
2  Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Fueled Again? In search of Energy Security,” in Blindside, ed. 
Francis Fukuyama (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 74.  
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primary factor for her attitudes, and how the militarization of energy resources 
affects Turkey’s participation in and attitude towards regional conflicts.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
This paper does not seek to answer what the importance of Turkey is for 
the European Union (EU) and U.S. from the perspective of energy security. 
Instead, this paper argues that the nature of warfare has changed, especially 
after the Cold War, and the future wars could be based on “militarization of 
energy resources.”3 Using Turkey as a case study, this paper examines its 
energy policies and experiences from 1945 to 2009 in an attempt to ascertain to 
what extent energy concerns determined Turkey’s involvement in interstate 
disputes and conflicts. 
Since an understanding of a country’s past behavior may help better 
predict its future acts, this topic is of great relevance to international affairs. Prior 
research on Turkey’s foreign policy and energy security attempts to answer how 
and why Turkey behaves the way it does in the conflicts in the ME.4 This study 
will fill a gap in the previous research by analyzing Turkey’s history in order to 
determine whether the militarization of energy resources has served to influence 
Turkey’s participation in and attitude towards regional conflicts.  
The Turkish Parliament’s decision not to participate in the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces provides an excellent example of energy 
concerns influencing national security. Although Turkey transports Iraqi oil via the 
                                            
3  James A. Russell and Daniel Moran,  ed., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management, ed. James A. Russell and Daniel Moran (Routledge: 
Taylor & Francis, 2008), http://lib.myilibrary.com/Browse/open.asp?ID=170695&loc=cover  (4 
December 2009). . 
4  Nursin Atesoglu Guney, ed., Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey 
(Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007).   
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Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline,5 twenty days after the Turkish Parliament’s decision not 
to allow the basing of coalition forces on Turkish soil, it authorized the use of 
Turkish air space by the U.S. and coalition  air forces. 
C. THESIS AND MAIN ARGUMENTS 
Related to the major question of whether there is any historical evidence 
that Turkey has been involved in situations where energy has been used as a 
political tool, this paper seeks to answer the question of what challenges, seven 
years after the invasion of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces, might Turkey 
encounter in the ME, especially related to Syria, Iraq and Iran in this new era. 
Considering these challenges, how should Turkey craft its ME policy? What 
measures should be taken? Correspondingly, after the Cold War era what are 
the threats to Turkey’s region? How will the transformation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) affect her region? Regarding Turkey’s decision-
making processes and national security policy, which benchmarks or factors 
should be established to determine threat assessments? 
Although this paper seeks to explore Turkey’s energy policies from 1945 
to the present, research shows that there are two distinct periods related to 
Turkey’s treatment of energy security. The first phase is the non-conflict zone or 
preparation phase, from the 1960s to the 1980s, and the second phase is energy 
disputes in the post-Cold War era. During the exploration phase, it is appropriate 
to narrow the focus from over fifty years to a significant period of time. This paper 
starts with the historical background of the ME region from the energy 
perspective and preconditions for both Turkey and her neighbors during the 
1940s and the 1990s. Understanding the historical context is important and 
establishes a context for what follows. The chronology also includes regional 
                                            
5 First, the Turkish parliament, on March 1, 2003, rejected a bill authorizing the basing of U.S. 
troops in Turkey. But several weeks later, Turkey's parliament approved a resolution authorizing 
U.S. warplanes to fly through Turkish airspace in the military campaign to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein. Voice of America News, “Turkish Parliament Authorizes Use of Air Space by U.S. in Iraq 
War-2003-03-20,” VOA NEWS, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2003-03-20-30-
Turkish-67303532.html.  
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events before the 1960s for a better understanding of the fundamental basis by 
which Turkey’s attitude has been shaped. This paper continues with the 
establishment of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), while it is obvious 
that the oil price shock in 1973 initiated the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
which became the counterpart of the OIC.  While analyzing the occurrence of two 
blocks of the energy market, this paper explains that Turkey has pursued a 
successful foreign policy to balance these two institutions, while remaining a 
member of both of them. The paper details Turkey’s economic conditions during 
the oil price crisis in the 1970s, and shows that “the rights of buyers and sellers in 
the energy marketplace become explicit objects or tools of strategic coercion, 
either by governments or by others who may be able to seize control of them.”6 
This paper ends with the tanker wars between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988. 
Turkey did not participate in this conflict, even though its naval assets for energy 
were lost during the conflict. 
The answer to the major research question, “Is there any historical 
evidence that Turkey has been involved in situations where energy has been 
used as a political tool?” is that the Cold War era can be characterized as a 
preparation phase for future energy usage as a weapon. The findings in this 
thesis suggest that Turkey’s treatment of energy issues emerge in its 
participation in the OIC and the IEA, the 1970s oil price crisis with Turkey’s debt 
crisis and relations with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), and lastly, the tanker wars during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). This 
paper fills a gap in the previous research by analyzing Turkey’s history in an 
attempt to determine whether the militarization of energy resources has served to 
influence Turkey’s attitudes towards regional energy conflicts.7  (Table 1–2) 
                                            
6 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management. (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 
2008), http://lib.myilibrary.com/Browse/open.asp?ID=170695&loc=cover (December 4, 2009). 
7 Throughout this paper, the term “energy conflicts” refers to any kind of energy (petroleum 
and natural gas) debates, oil price crises, and debates over energy agreements.  
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Table 1.   Middle East regional events related to energy debates (centered on 
Turkey)  
Turkey managed to balance two sides of the energy market (OPEC as a 
seller and IEA as a buyer) to reach the goal of a reliable energy hub for both 
sides.  
 
                                            
8 Although Turkey’s transportation vessels were sunk during this war, it is classified within the 
preparation phase because there was no engagement with its neighbor states and the trend of 






























TYPE A - - - - - - - 
TYPE B - - - + + - - 
TYPE C - - - - - + - 
TYPE D - - - - + - - 
TYPE E - - - - - - + 
TYPE F + + + - - - - 
TYPE G - - + + + - + 
Table 2.   Regional energy issues and categorizations of militarization of 
energy 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis provides a historical analysis of Turkey as a case study. First, 
this thesis defines the concept of the militarization of energy security and how the 
concept is related to Turkey’s circumstances. Second, this thesis explores how 
Turkey acted under these circumstances and how these behaviors affected 
Turkey’s energy and foreign policy. Finally, this thesis determines the effects of 
these decisions by comparing them with the events after the 1990s. 
To assess Turkey’s behaviors during these energy debates, the author 
utilized numerous resources. James Russell’s and Daniel Moran’s book Energy 
Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management initiated 
the idea as a missing chapter for the book and the research question was chosen 
from Turkish Air Force orders on Research Subjects and Themes for Master of 
Art Degree. These works provide insightful general comments for future 
prospects in the ME, while this study will help develop future studies and 
solutions to assist decision makers during different energy debates.  
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E. ORGANIZATION 
The introduction details the major research question, the methodology and 
the main arguments, and introduces the reader to the energy issues. The first 
part will examine the concept of militarization of energy assets and identifies 
Turkey’s role in those conflicts to determine the environmental conditions by 
looking at chronology. The second part discusses two historical case studies on 
Turkey’s energy outlook, while the last chapter provides a war in Turkey’s area to 
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II. DEFINITIONS AND CHRONOLOGY 
This chapter is organized in two parts: (1) the definition of the concept of 
the militarization of energy security; and (2) chronology of the events around 
Turkey from the establishment to present. The first section provides the 
terminology and issues on energy security within the literature and continues with 
Turkey’s role in it, grouping the events centered on Turkey. The second section 
consists of an historic chronology that provides the context for a better 
understanding of Turkey as an energy security case study.   
A. MILITARIZATION OF ENERGY SECURITY DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 
Conventional wisdom holds that the oil weapon used against the 
United States and its allies in the 1970s is obsolete . . . In October 
2002, member countries of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference considered an oil embargo as a way to stop the United 
States from attacking Iraq.9 
As an organized thesis, academic and policy literature related to the 
militarization of energy security and its effects on Turkey’s relations with its 
neighbors as a member of Europe and NATO must first be settled. Although a 
significant body of research emphasizes Turkey’s pursuit of energy security, this 
thesis will mainly examine the concept of energy as a weapon. The changing 
nature of NATO alliances and its impact on Turkey’s geostrategic position are 
also examined. Furthermore, as interconnected with Europe, Turkey’s 
importance in energy issues is investigated. This study then explores Turkey’s 
current energy ties in the ME.  Although there are many international or domestic 
energy routes through other countries, this thesis excludes them and focuses on 
Turkey’s own domestic pipelines.  
                                            
9  Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Fueled Again? In Search of Energy Security,” in Blindside, ed. 
Francis Fukuyama (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). 
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Literature on the matter of energy security discloses common concepts of 
energy security and the global market. What is the meaning of energy security? 
On its Web site of World Energy Outlook 2008, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) states that energy security means “access to adequate, affordable and 
reliable supplies of energy.” 10 While oil is the main subject during the 1970s and 
1980s, as a reliable supply for electricity, natural gas is now included in the 
terminology.11 This is important because human development and economy are 
tied to energy. Thus, in this market, any changes in the suppliers or on the 
demand side have an impact on the other participants. Nobody wants instability 
or global warfare. Table 3 shows the vulnerability of the market in such an 
instability event. 
Short term Long term 
Disruptions or shortages through  
(Sabotage, political intervention, strikes, 
technical failures, accidents or natural 
disaster) 
Under-investment in                
(crude oil production, refining or 
transportation capacity, other 
market failures) 
Table 3.   Insecurity Conditions for Energy12 
The essential item for the energy market in the 21st century is not money 
or land, but resources. British Petroleum’s (BP’s) commonly cited Web site 
provides the statistical data of the world’s trade, including major fossil fuels, and 
this indicates that security now extends through overdependence on both oil and 
natural gas (Figures 1–2). The solution to overcome the insecurity conditions 
(Table 3) based on weaknesses of the market is: 
                                            
10 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2008,” OECD/IEA, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/2008.asp. 




…adequate investment in production, processing, transportation 
and storage capacity to meet projected needs. More efficient 
energy use to reduce the risk of demand running ahead of 
deliverability. More diversity in the fuel mix, geographic sources and 
types of supply transportation routes and market participants.13 
 
Figure 1.   Oil Trade Flows in 2008. (million tonnes). (From:14) 
 
 
Figure 2.   Natural-gas Trade flows in 2008. (billion cubic meters). (From:15) 
                                            
13 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” OECD/IEA, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/2009.asp. 




A valuable reference revealing what challenges states may confront 
concerning the nature of wars in the 21st century is James Russell and Daniel 
Moran’s Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource 
Management. They argue that conflict among developed states could re-emerge 
as a global source of instability as a result of conflicts over energy supply.16 The 
energy market is vulnerable to war for any reason. It is possible to have violence 
through energy security. Recently, threats to energy security became a threat to 
national security, and energy became a weapon to eliminate the opponent’s will 
politically. Thus, militarization of energy security provides: 
…issues that may arise if control of energy resources, or the rights 
of buyers and sellers in the energy marketplace, become explicit 
objects or tools of strategic coercion, either by governments or by 
others who may be able to seize control of them. Energy resources 
may become casus belli in themselves; or they may be viewed as 
alternatives to the use of force by governments, who persuade 
themselves that wielding the “energy weapon” will somehow 
obviate or substitute for the use of real ones.17 
Russell’s and Moran’s study reveals that oil as a limited resource gets 
priced in the international market, and states have to trust this market for their 
energy security. Their study suggests that the free market may regulate high 
prices due to “peak oil”18 and countries may adopt themselves to the new 
environment. They also suggest that the costs of war to control energy resources 
are much higher than the benefits. The buyers and sellers may tolerate the prices 
regulated by market. When the price of oil becomes too expensive to use for 
energy, the market determines the price at a high level so that alternative fuels 
can be developed. In addition, members of the market may decide to go to war 
for fossil fuels, not only because of high energy prices, but also because of 
crises, which provide distrust of the price regulation to the supply/demand 
                                            
16 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management  (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 
2008), http://lib.myilibrary.com/Browse/open.asp?ID=170695&loc=cover  (December 4, 2009). 
17 Ibid., 3. 
18 Ibid. 
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relation in the market.19 Another assumption of Russell and Moran is that 
terrorism is not a systemic threat to energy security. Terrorists attack production 
refineries, transportation lines and critical points such as Strait of Hormuz.20 
From their point of view, the U.S. interest is protection of “market-based access 
to energy” to sustain energy stability against terrorism or Chindia.21 It is the 
U.S.’s responsibility to defend the market against any pressure. For instance, the 
Carter doctrine emphasized the use of force to protect the Gulf against Soviet 
expansion. 
Russell and Moran argue that potential causes of future energy-related 
conflicts include such scenarios as:   
-direct seizure of energy assets by military means [TYPE A], -
destruction of energy assets to deny their use to rivals [TYPE B], -
military confrontation arising from competitive efforts to exploit new 
energy resources on the high seas, where legal claims of 
sovereignty are absent . . . in the Arctic and Antarctic . . . [TYPE C], 
-indirect control of energy assets through the creation of puppet 
states, military protection of, or attacks upon, the energy production 
and transportation infrastructure, including oil fields, refineries, 
pipelines, port facilities[TYPE D], -active military control of 
international straits through which energy assets move [TYPE E], -
development of exclusive energy trading blocs, reminiscent of the 
systems of “imperial preference” that existed before 1945 [TYPE F], 
and –conveyance of major military assets to regional energy 
producers in exchange for preferential market treatment, or with a 
view to enabling them to impose themselves upon neighboring 
states [TYPE G].22  
One of the best examples from their book is of a request for the 
fortification of great purchaser states. Small consumers are unlikely to use 
energy as leverage, but they have little to lose, so they may revolt against the 
                                            
19 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management  (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 
2008), http://lib.myilibrary.com/Browse/open.asp?ID=170695&loc=cover  (December 4, 2009). 
20 Ibid., 10. 
21 Ibid., 11. 
22 Ibid., 7. 
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system by use of force. Additionally, it may be beneficial for the suppliers 
because of high prices, while providing sustainable demand, or suppliers may go 
under powerful states’ shield. 23 
On the other hand, useful literature about NATO, the EU and Turkey 
reveals that while the EU, Turkey’s energy costumer, emphasizes energy 
dependency and the requirement of diversification via Turkey, NATO has been 
participating in aforementioned energy conflicts, and Turkey emerges as an 
“energy hub” in the ME. 
As an alliance, NATO also has energy concerns. Although the EU and 
U.S. implicitly trust the free market, some suppliers’ oil and natural gas are still 
used for political purposes. At this point, could NATO play an international role to 
ensure the free flow of energy? In addition to NATO members, ME countries 
(Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates) and Partnership for Peace 
program (PfP) countries (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) support NATO in 
transforming into global security cooperation to protect their resources.24 An 
example is NATO forces’ effective engagement for the free flow of energy 
against recent piracy on the transportation line in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, 
NATO, as a global player, may employ military measures against destabilizing 
events such as the close of the Hormuz Straits.25 Moreover, Turkey (a NATO 
member), and Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (members of PfP) have an important 
role to ensure energy security by diversifying energy supplies through pipelines 
from the Caspian and Central Asia region “avoiding the Russian energy grid.”26 
                                            
23 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, eds., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management  (Routledge Global Security Studies: Taylor & Francis, 
2008), http://lib.myilibrary.com/Browse/open.asp?ID=170695&loc=cover  (December 4, 2009), 88. 
24 Paul Gallis, “Report RS22409 NATO and Energy Security,” Congressional Research 
Service, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22409. 
25 Eli Lake, “Iran Threatens Strait of Hormuz: Key Oil Shipping Passage Could Be Blocked 
for a Month,” The New York Sun, August 5, 2008, News section, 
http://www.nysun.com/foreign/iran-threatens-to-shut-strait-of-hormuz/83142/. 
26 Paul Gallis, “Report RS22409 NATO and Energy Security,” Congressional Research 
Service, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22409. 
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Furthermore, as NATO’s major powers (U.S., France, Great Britain, and 
Italy) use their solidarity to protect the oil infrastructure in Kuwait against the 
aforementioned direct seizure of energy assets by the Iraqi military, they ensure 
the security of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers in the Gulf war.27 Another 
example of Russell’ and Moran’s argument is Operation Earnest Will during the 
Iran-Iraq war of 1980–88. First Iran, then Iraq tried to blockade their opponent’s 
financial gains by attacking civilian oil tankers. Iran also attacked Kuwaiti and 
Saudi tankers to cut off transportation. As a reaction to this hostility, the Kuwaitis 
accepted the Soviet Union and U.S. offers to sail their oil tankers under USSR 
and U.S. flags. However, Iraqi’s attacks on an American vessel, the USS Stark, 
in 1987 initiated a U.S.-led NATO coalition movement against it. France, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands were important participants. They captured Iranian 
forces while mining shipping lanes and engaged in firefights with them. 
Alternatively, European energy dependency on imported oil and natural 
gas is too critical and obvious. The EU imports 50 percent of its energy needs, 
while key supplier Russia provides 40 percent of their gas needs, and 45 percent 
of their oil comes from the ME. Recently, Russia used oil and gas as a political 
tool and sought high prices to make high profits, “powerful political and economic 
lever of influence over the rest of the world,”28 especially by state-owned 
Gazprom.29  
The EU rules are not based on either energy or pipeline routes. Egenhofer 
argues that the EU’s fundamental basis and principles are “community loyalty, 
non-discrimination as to nationality, principle of conferral, rules not money.”30 
                                            
27 Paul Gallis, “Report RS22409 NATO and Energy Security,” Congressional Research 
Service, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22409. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Keith Crane, Andreas Goldthau, Michael Toman, Thomas Light, Stuart E. Johnson, Alireza 
Nader, Angel Rabasa, and Harun Dogo, Imported Oil and U.S. National Security: Oil as a Foreign 
Policy Instrument (RAND, 2009), 25–41. 
30 Christian Egenhofer, Sebastian Kurpas, and Louise van Schaik, The Ever-Changing Union 
an Introduction to the History, Institutions and Decision-Making Processes of the European Union 
(Brussels: CEPS, 2009), http://www.ceps.eu/node/1613 (accessed November 20, 2009). 
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Specifically, energy security is not among the EU’s goals. However, Egenhofer 
assumes that dependence on energy is a major concern for the EU since it holds 
43 percent of the EU’s total budget in 2008.31 Egenhofer also emphasizes the 
reality of energy bargaining due to political leverage. Research on gas disputes 
between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 are clues 
that the “status quo is defective and unsustainable as a policy.”32 This 
“intolerable situation”33 has effects on the shifts in the U.S.-EU-Russian 
Federation geopolitical triangle because of dependency and high energy 
prices.34 
The crisis resulted in construction of new pipelines which are Nord Stream 
and South Stream, bypassing Ukraine. In fact, Russia seems unhappy with “the 
existing architecture of the International Security” and its purpose is to become 
“an important shaper of it.”35 Charap argues that “gas war” creates “incentives for 
the Russians to work with Western partners” and his suggestion is a requirement 
of reforms in “U.S.-Russia energy dialogue and energy efficiency and alternatives 
to the agenda.”36 This confirms Turkey’s strategic importance as an alternative 
such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. 
Research on Turkey as an energy hub suggests that Turkey is a transit 
country geographically, and Turkey’s energy diplomacy may open the gate to EU 
                                            
31 Christian Egenhofer et al., The Ever-Changing Union an Introduction to the History, 
Institutions and Decision-Making Processes of the European Union (Brussels: CEPS, 2009), 
http://www.ceps.eu/node/1613 (accessed November 20, 2009). 
32 Elena Gnedina and Michael Emerson, The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium in Ukraine: 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis (CEPS Policy Briefs, 2009), www.ceeol.com. 
33 Ibid., 9. 
34 Jeffrey Mankoff, Eurosian Energy Security (Council Special Report 43, 2009), 
http://cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Eurasia_CSR43.pdf. 
35 Christian Egenhofer  et al., The Ever-Changing Union-An Introduction to the History, 
Institutions and Decision-Making Processes of the European Union (Brussels: CEPS, 2009), 
http://www.ceps.eu/node/1613 (accessed Nov 20, 2009). 
36 Samuel Charap and Andrew C. Kuchins, Economic Whiplash in Russia, (CSIS, February 
2009), http://au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/russia09.html. 
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membership.37 Turkey functions as an energy bridge with natural gas and oil 
pipelines formed in two directions38: North-South corridor and East-West 
Corridor. (Figure 3–4) The East-West corridor provides the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Crude Oil Pipeline (BTC), Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, South Caucasus (Shah 
Deniz) Natural-gas Pipeline (SCP) or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline (BTE), 
Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural-gas Pipeline, Nabucco Natural-gas pipeline, Trans-
Caspian Oil and Gas pipeline projects, and Iran-Turkey Natural-gas pipeline.39 
North-South Corridor includes Egypt-Turkey Natural-gas pipeline, Samsun-
Ceyhan bypass Oil Pipeline (proposed), Blue-Stream Gas Pipeline.40 The close 
alliances between U.S. and Turkey created BTC. This is important because 
BTC41 is the only route bypassing Turkey’s straits and the Russian Federation. 
On the other hand, the U.S. invasion of Iraq created an instability for the Kirkuk-
Ceyhan twin pipeline42 and on Web in a comment posted to the OGJ Oil 
Diplomacy Blog on November 25, 2009, Eric Watkins noted that this pipeline has 
still encountered sabotage, while it is the only alternative route for Hormuz 
Straits. (Figure 5) SCP (9.9 Tcf/year capacity) brings Azeri gas via Georgia, but 
the recent Russia-Georgia conflict affected the energy flow. Blue Stream (565 
Bcf/year capacity) carries gas from Russia via the Black Sea, but under its 
capacity because of price disputes. However, Turkey and Russia have a 
discussion on an extension of pipelines to Israel via the Mediterranean Sea. The 
construction of BTE began in 2003 and finished in 2006; there was a delay in 
                                            
37 Some examples include: Aysegul Tabak, “The EU Energy Security Considerations and 
Turkey’s Possible Membership” (MA thesis, Bilkent University, 2009), http://tez2.yok.gov.tr/; 
Huseyin Seslikaya, “Energy Security and Turkey” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008); 
Erkan Arslan, “Defense Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2007). 
38 Ibid, 32.  
39 Ibid, 79–84  
40 Ibid, 85–88.  
41 BTC is 1,770 kilometers and has a capacity of 1 million bbl/d. 
42 The capacity of the pipeline is 1.65 million bbl/d and it is the shortest and only open way to 
reach the Mediterranean. 
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exportation until 2007. Furthermore, supply from Iran has been disrupted due to 
debates on Iranian increased-domestic consumption in the past.43  
Commonly cited data of the Energy Information Administration and Oil & 
Gas Journal examines Turkey’s energy outlook. Turkey’s total energy 
consumption (as of 2006) was: oil 35 percent, natural gas 29 percent, coal 25 
percent, and hydroelectric 11 percent. Turkey’s proven oil reserves of 300 million 
barrels are located mostly in the southeast region.  Turkey has natural gas 
reserves estimated at 300 billion cubic feet (Bcf). Although the domestic 
production level is at 45 thousand billions barrel per day (bbl/d), consumption is 
around 700 thousand bbl/d. Similarly, Turkey’s gas production is at 32 Bcf, well 
below the 1.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of domestic consumption. Russia is the 
leading oil supplier, followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The state-owned firm, 
Turkish Petroleum State Company (TPAO), has a 70 percent share of the total oil 
production of the country. Turkey’s largest gas field is offshore in the Marmara 
Sea and is operated by three firms: TPAO, BP, and Shell. The biggest gas 
supplier is Russia (Gazprom), followed by Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria, and Nigeria. 
Tankers deliver oil to Turkey through the port at Istanbul and Ceyhan terminal on 
the Mediterranean coast. The Energy Markets Regulatory Authority (EMRA) 
regulates the gas sector and the dominant shareholder is also a state-owned 
company, BOTAS. Though 78 percent of the gas market is open to the 
competition, BOTAS currently has a monopoly over interior delivery. As a result, 
Turkey is a net oil and natural gas importer.44 
                                            
43 The capacity of the Iran-Turkey pipeline is 494 Bcf/year. 
44 Energy Information Administration, “Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government: 




Figure 3.   Turkey’s Oil Pipelines45 
 
Figure 4.   Turkey’s Gas Pipelines46 
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Figure 5.   Pipelines in the Gulf47 
B. REGIONAL CHRONOLOGY 
Regional history suggests an intense period of energy exploration and 
development during the first half of the 20th century. During that time, Turkey 
united with the U.S. under the Truman Doctrine and joined NATO. While Turkey’s 
                                            
47 Simon Henderson, “Policy Focus #83: Energy in Danger: Iran, Oil, and the West,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2008), 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=291. 
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neighbors were instable (for example, the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956), Turkey 
participated in a second alliance, the Baghdad Pact, binding with Iraq and Britain 
(1955). A major event for energy security occurred in 1960 with the foundation of 
OPEC. Two wars (the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War) come forward as a 
precondition for OPEC’s oil embargo in 1973.  The most important event for 
Turkey’s energy outlook was the 1980s Iran-Iraq War. Chapter 3 focuses on this 
issue. Regional instability affected Turkey’s neighbors and energy transit routes 
(Figure 4–5). 48  
Another finding is that Turkey’s internal affairs and her alliance with the 
U.S. exerted strong influences on its policies. One example is that during World 
War II, Turkey managed to sustain her neutrality and this continued, emerging 
“as a key actor in the early years of the Cold War.” The Truman Doctrine became 
a turning point in this regard for “U.S. commitment to bolster the ‘northern tier’ of 
Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan as a bar to Soviet adventurism in the 
Middle East.”49 On Turkey’s side, a bilateral military aid agreement during the 
1950s strengthened its regional posture. As a result, the close relations with the 








                                            
48 Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 
49 Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War (RAND, 1992), 
32–33.  
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III. GOOD RELATIONS WITH OPEC AND IEA MEMBERSHIP 
AND THEIR EFFECTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The important issue for Turkey is where and how her energy 
supplies will be obtained: these choices are fraught with 
complications, liabilities, and hazards. Such considerations have 
become more important as an aspect of Turkey’s foreign policy… 
because Ankara does not want to be overly dependent on any one 
source.50 
Turkey, as a net energy importing country and an energy hub for the 
regional energy market, has recently experienced the aforementioned 
militarization of energy resources. These energy debates raise the question, “Are 
these debates new to Turkish foreign policy or has Turkey experienced the 
usage of energy as a weapon in her past history?” Research suggests that 
Turkey has passed through a preparation phase, which included Eastern ties by 
OIC-membership and good relations with OPEC, while at the same time binding 
with the West through IEA-membership until the 1980s to avoid becoming a 
target to disadvantageous external pressure. Energy security, however, placed 
top of the foreign policy agenda with the 1973 oil price shock and during the 
1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. These three historical energy issues are important as a 
basis to understand Turkey’s energy security outlook. During the 1990s, a series 
complex energy deals aimed at are toward diversification of energy needs based 
suggests that Turkey learned much from these historical lessons.51 
                                            
50 Brent Sasley, “Turkey’s Energy Politics,” in Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging 
Multiregional Power, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2001), 217. 
51 Such moves can be shortly expressed here: as in 1996 after a deal with Iran to purchase 
$23 billion worth of gas, Iran became the top second supplier, while Blue-stream pipeline 
agreement with Russian firm, Gazprom, and Italian firm, ENI in 1999, although opening of BTC 
pipeline which carries Azerbaijan oil via Georgia will cut other’s interests (political and economic 
leverage and transfer remittances) in the region. 13. Brent Sasley, “Turkey’s Energy Politics,” in 
Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging Multiregional Power, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 220–222. 
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This chapter asserts that Turkey managed to balance her energy market 
until the 1980s by pursuing successful policies (decisions to construct 
relationships with consumers and suppliers) mainly because of her domestic 
energy needs rather than international concerns. 
This section demonstrates how internal conditions forced Turkey to 
establish energy relations with both oil exporting countries and oil consumers. 
Focusing on these cases is important because debates about such issues as 
Turkey’s non-participation in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 raised many 
questions about Turkey’s reliability as a U.S. security partner.  This section 
explores Turkey’s acts with her neighbors until the 1980s by examining her 
strategic decisions on energy and her attitudes about the 1973 OPEC oil 
embargo and the resulting increasing oil prices.52 Before discussing the 
aftermath of 1973 price shock, this paper summarizes the conditions before the 
1960s, then explains the political and economic arena from the Turkish foreign 
policy perspective, and ends with the IEA membership period. 
B. TURKEY’S POLITICAL CONDITIONS DURING THE 1970S 
Experts argue that the dynamics of the Cold War separate Turkey and the 
Arab World into opposite sides. Turkey abandoned her position of neutrality and 
became aligned with the West. The Arabs states mostly chose to align with the  
Soviet bloc due to their “nationalist movements anti-Jewish and anti-imperialist” 
attitudes.53 As shown in Table 1–2, Turkey’s participation in NATO opened a new 
term in Turkey’s relations with her neighbors. This alliance against a rising Soviet 
threat enforced the Western defense while causing increased hostility against the 
Arab World.54 The Baghdad Pact (Table 1–2) managed to establish containment 
                                            
52 Brent Sasley, “Turkey’s Energy Politics,” in Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging 
Multiregional Power, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2001), 218, 232. 
53 Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim 
World (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 33–36. 
54 Ibid. 
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of the Soviet Union. In contrast, other Arab states whose priority was a position 
of hostility against Israel and the United States disagreed with Turkey. 
Additionally, Turkey deployed her troops to the Syrian border against rising 
communism in 1957, and in 1958 Turkey attempted to call for Western allies to 
intervene in Iraq to restore the monarchy.55 (Table1–2) 
The dependency on western defense, as Graham stated, decreased in the 
late 1960s in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, and the U.S. policy toward 
Cyprus. Although Turkey experienced political and economical patterns that 
differed from her Arab neighbors during those years, the new foreign policy 
concerns became “new economic interests, Greece, Cyprus, and the Kurdish 
problem.”56 There is evidence that Turkish foreign policy became transformed 
from “single-minded strategic commitment to the U.S.” to active policies due to 
doubts about “the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the degree of U.S. 
sensitivity to Turkish interests.”57  
In the 1970s, Turkey established close bilateral relationships with Middle 
Eastern suppliers as an energy bridge.  Good examples of this rapprochement 
are Turkey’s neutrality during both the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel Wars and 
denials of the U.S. use of Turkish bases while starting to earn transport fees (up 
to $1.2 billion) via the Iraqi pipeline in 1977. Doing this, Turkey obtains “economic 
benefits and greater international support for her foreign policy goals” in the 
1970s.58 
C. TURKEY’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS DURING PREPARATION PHASE 
Due to Turkey’s position between oil producers and consumers, Turkey 
always became the first country to face economic crisis in the case of any usage 
                                            
55 Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim 
World (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008),.34. 
56 Ibid., 33–36. And for detailed information on political and economical conditions see Table 
4. 
57 Ibid., 33–40. 
58 Ibid. 
 26
of energy as a political leverage. In the 1970s, Turkey was faced with energy 
security issues because of these reasons: (1) High dependency on solely oil and 
high oil prices brings debts to un-payable levels, (2) maintaining low stockpile 
levels results in sustaining the weaknesses. 
The dependency on oil was so high that half of Turkey’s entire energy 
sources were oil in the late 1970s.59 According to data, augmented oil imports 
(from 2.9 to 11.7 million tons per year) resulted in a decrease in coal and other 
sources. There are two reasons for this dependency. One of them was the 
political inability to sustain prices at reasonable level, and second was the lack of 
diversification from oil. Thus, the financial expenses increased sharply, as well as 
the oil bill.60 On the other hand, the energy consumption trend continued to 
escalate with a decline in interior oil production during the 1977–81.61 Thus, 
Turkey was faced with financial turmoil because of the revenue gap between 
exporting and importing, since the “oil import expenditure was one-third greater 
than the total of Turkish export earnings”62 in the period of 1973 to 1980.  
Alternatively, the stockpile level in 1974, 40 days, was the same as the 
1980s, even though the IEA had warned to increase them to 90 days as a 
precautionary measure. This is important because, being highly dependent on 
oil, Turkey became much more vulnerable to OPEC’s pressure. However, as a 
lesson learned from the 1973 oil price shock, the other states such as Japan and 
Spain increased their stockpiles up to 100 days to strengthen their 
weaknesses.63   
                                            
59 In 1977, oil consumption peaked at 53 percent of Turkey’s energy sources. 
60 The oil bill’s share of overall import expenditure increased from 9.3 to 49.5 percent. Alon 
Liel, Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 
29. 
61 Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001), 28. 
62 Ibid., 29. 
63 Ibid., 38. 
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As a result, research indicates, “Turkey was almost completely dependent 
on Muslim countries for her oil.”64 The major suppliers during 1975–84 were Iraq, 
Libya, and Iran. Since transportation from Saudi Arabia was halted, Turkey had 
to depend on her neighbor Muslim OPEC countries by using her historical ties. 
The Kirkuk-Dortyol pipeline is a good example for this. 
This project started with an agreement on 27 August 1973 to build a 
1,000-kilometer pipeline from the Kirkuk area of northern Iraq to the Gulf of 
Iskenderun in the south of Turkey. According to a twenty-year agreement, 
approximately 35 million tons of oil would flow through this pipeline over a fixed-
price of thirty-five cents for each barrel.  However, the aftermath of the 1973 oil 
price crisis required the agreement conditions to be revised. Stable and low 
passage fees, Turkey’s un-payable oil bills, and Kurdish rebels in the area 
created new demands from the Iraqi government. Thus, Table 4 indicates that 
the agreement ratification process took eighteen months. This means, as shown 
in the Figures 3–5, once Iraqi oil flow was shuttled down via Syria in April 1976, 
Turkey was positioned as the only outlet to the Mediterranean, which was 
beneficial for Turkey as the budget gained as much as $100 million a year 
through passage fees. Ironically, the same reliance came to this alternative route, 
since Turkey’s unpaid oil bills, which reached up to $230 million, caused the 
suspension of oil flow until August 1978.65 This case is similar to the Russian-
Ukraine gas dispute in 2009. The subjects of the debate (interruption of 110 
million cubic meters per day) were the price of gas sold to Ukraine, payment of 
outstanding debt and transit fees, which were the same as that between Iraq and 
Turkey. The Europeans responded by securing alternative routes and managing 
their existing stocks more carefully. The time period for interruption in both cases 
was the same (around 10 months).66     
                                            
64 Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001,33. 
65 Ibid., 29–40. 
66 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” OECD/IEA, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/2009.asp. 
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Turkey acutely felt the impact of the global economic slowdown that 
followed the Arab oil embargo.  Turkey suffered from high inflation, a declining 
balance of payments position, reduced industrial production, and high 
unemployment rates.  
Research shows that the debt trend started with an amount of $145 million 
at the end of 1974, and continued to rise to $1 billion at the end of 1975. In  
1976, it reached $1.8 billion in terms of short-term bank loans. Turkey introduced 
austerity measures to pay her debts, and reduce inflation through a restrictive 
monetary policy./67 As a result, Turkey as an energy bridge became a waterless 
fountain in 1979, mainly because of severe financing problems, refusals by other 
OPEC countries (such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Republic) to 
provide Turkey with credits for oil imports, and the inability to meet requirements 
of trade agreements with Iran, Iraq, and Libya.68 
D. TURKEY’S IEA MEMBERSHIP PROCESS 
Although consumer states declared various internal and external solutions 
to overcome the second order effects of the oil price shock, none of them used 
the energy as a causus belli to resort to the use of force. While both Germany 
and France signed bilateral natural-gas pipeline deals with the Soviet Union, 
France and Japan expanded their usage of nuclear power, and put more taxes 
on gasoline consumption.69 As a reaction to the 1973 oil embargo, an idea to 
create a counterpart of OPEC to regulate buyers’ rights emerged in 1974 in the 
U.S. This cartel of oil consumer states was formed to prepare for a future 
embargo by OPEC. The basic definition of this newly established international 
                                            
67 Lucille W. Pevsner, The Washington Papers: Turkey’s Political Crisis (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1984), 78. 
68 Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001), 44. 
69 James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, ed., Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 
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organization is that IEA70 is “an economic NATO,” and it aims to “strengthen the 
position of the international oil companies, which was greatly diminished 
following OPEC’s unilateral moves.”71 At this point, it is worth mentioning how 
important Turkey’s membership into this newly established organization was for 
both sides.72  
Even though Turkey participated in the OIC since the late 1960s, it was 
easier than Turkey’s participation in the Western trade bloc, IEA. Due to the wide 
impact on the sellers’ side, a strong opposition against IEA membership was 
created during the process.73 Arab countries were irritated and originated wide 
public discussions, while their diplomats in the embassies expressed their 
displeasure toward the agency by increasing foreign pressure against Turkey, 
including Iraq’s compelling demands on Turkey’s unpaid bills in that era. Despite 
these problems, Turkey nonetheless joined the IEA. The decisive factor is the 
foreign office, because the decision for leading Turkey into the IEA was made 
during the transition period between two cabinets, Ecevit and Sadi Irmak.74 
Similarly, Turkey had already lost the special prices for Iraqi oil in 1974 and 
revenues from the fixed-price transit fee were not sufficient to reject the offer. 
Some domestic objections were made on the basis of preventing any kind of 
                                            
70 The current goals of 26-member IEA are: to maintain and improve systems for coping with 
oil supply disruptions; to promote rational energy policies in a global context through cooperative 
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efficiency of energy use; and to assist in the integration of environmental and energy policies. 
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escalations in the energy market, since the U.S. Secretary of State’s statement 
toward possible use of force against the sellers in 1975.   
Although early efforts to establish membership were faced with hostile oil 
producers’ objections during 1977–78, the ratification for participation into IEA 
was made in 1981.75 Thus, the 1970s can be identified as highly dependent on 
Muslim oil producers’ supplies. Moreover, although this was dangerous for the 
country in terms of energy security, Turkey had no alternative to diversify both oil 
and suppliers, such as a sufficient level of natural gas demand and Russia as a 
supplier in the 1990s. In this regard, IEA did not either protect or harm Turkey’s 
energy security posture.76 
“Until 1973 energy and especially oil is not the biggest concern to 
establish Ankara’s foreign relations, but energy crisis in 1973 shifts this reality.”77 
Nevertheless, Turkey’s oil supply during 1970–80 resulted in financial 
turmoil and increased her vulnerability to oil producers’ political demands due to 
oil bills, which reached at an un-payable level. Additionally, Turkey’s participation 
in IEA had no essential effects on Turkey’s interests, as the organization would in 
the near future (after the 1990s). On the contrary, Turkey earns her greatest 
profits from pipelines by linking the transit fees with the price of oil instead of the 
fixed-transport fees during the 1980–88 period of time. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter concludes that Turkey’s energy security 
concerns (efforts to be IEA member and have good relations with OPEC, and the 
unbearable debt crisis during the 1973 oil price crisis) were shaped based on 
domestic economic and political conditions during the 1970s. The evidence 
proves that Turkey encountered indirectly the usage of energy as a weapon in 
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76 Ibid., 50. 
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the event of the 1973 oil price shock. Turkey’s behavior toward cooperation with 
blocs was based the evolution of policies that showed a recognition of Turkey’s 
vulnerability to energy market forces. The end of this preparation phase initiated 
diversification efforts of energy to build better energy security in the next decade. 
However, the war between her neighbor producers in the beginning of this 
decade did give sufficient transition time to focus on energy security. The next 
chapter looks at the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) to determine what lessons can be 
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IV. 1980–88 IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND EFFECTS 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
Turkey has encountered three cases of energy-related security 
challenges: (1) Turkey’s relations with both neighbor oil producers (OPEC) and 
consumers (IEA) initiated in the early 1960s, (2) the 1973 oil price shock, and (3) 
the Tanker Wars (1980–88). The first two energy issues discussed in the 
previous chapter show that Turkey managed to reach good energy deals with her 
entire neighborhood under severe and fluctuating political and economic 
conditions. Ongoing domestic energy needs and the financial gap within the 
budget because of the high oil price increase made Turkey vulnerable in the 
early 1980s. Successful policies built a timely and strong energy bridge between 
two blocs, OPEC and the IEA. This chapter seeks to determine whether the Iran-
Iraq war of 1980–88 provides historical evidence to prove that energy has been 
used as a political and economic lever against Turkey  
This chapter analyzes the Tanker Wars (1980–88) to determine the role 
that energy security issues played in Turkey’s relations with her neighbors. This 
chapter shows that although the Tanker Wars had the harmful effect of 
decreasing Turkey’s transportation at sea, there were benefits as well: a positive 
impact on land transportation and an increase in the volume of the transfer fee 
via the pipelines. This section demonstrates how Turkey stayed out of the Tanker 
War on her borders. Focusing on this case, and specifically the attitudes of 
Turkey and her neighbors during the war, can provide essential insights for future 
energy debates. For example, there are more similarities than differences in 
Turkey’s neutrality situation during some regional conflicts in the 1980s and after 
2000. Before discussing the effects of this conflict, this paper summarizes the 
major issues related to the war chronologically until the 1990s, and then explains 
the rationale for Turkey’s nonparticipation in this war.  
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B. CHRONOLOGY 
World oil transit chokepoints are a critical part of global energy 
security. In 2007, global seaborne oil trade was approximately 43 
million barrels per day or about half of world oil production.78 
Table 4.   Chronological Events during Iran-Iraq War (Centered on energy). 79 
8 Mar 1980 Iran withdraws her ambassador from Iraq 
 
Sep 1980 Iraq abrogates the 1975 Algiers Agreement and declares it will exercise 
full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. Iran and Iraq attack each other’s 
oil facilities with the Iranian artillery bombardment on Khonqin and 






Iraq seeks ceasefires; rejected by Iran 
 
10 Apr 1982 Syria closes her oil pipeline to Iraqi oil 
 
12 Jun 1982 
25 Feb 1986 
 
UN resolution calls for a ceasefire 
2 Nov 1983 Iraq warns merchant vessels to avoid the ‘war zone’ at the northern end 
of the Gulf 
 
23 Jan 1984 Alleging Iranian involvement in Marine base bombing in Lebanon, the 
U.S. State Department adds Iran to the list of nations supporting 
terrorism, and thus subject to stringent export controls.80 
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Feb 1984 Iran captures Iraq’s oil-rich Majnun Islands. Iraq turns to attacking the 
Kharg Island oil terminal and Iranian ships in the Gulf, using French-
purchased Exocet missiles. Iran retaliates with strikes on Saudi and 
Kuwaiti ships 
12 Aug 1986 Successful long-range air raid on Iran’s oil terminal on Sirri Island 
26 Nov 1986 Air raid on Iran’s Larak island oil terminal 
23 Mar 1987 U.S. offers to protect Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf 
6 Apr 1987 Kuwait suggests re-registration of some tankers to U.S. ownership for 
protection, and seeks the transfer of others to Soviet registry 
14 Apr 1987 
 
USSR announces it will lease three tankers to Kuwait, so as to reduce 
Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti shipping 
15 Apr 1987 Iran warns Kuwait against leasing tankers to outside powers 
6 May 1987 U.S. agrees in principle to re-register 11 Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. 
flag 
21 May 1987 USS Stark attacked in Gulf by two Iraqi Exocet missiles, killing 37 
22 Jul 1987 U.S. Navy starts convoying Kuwaiti tankers flying U.S. flag 
4 Sep 1987 Iran fires missile at Kuwait; Kuwait expels 15 Iranian diplomats 
22 Sep 1987 U.S. ship attacks and captures Iranian mine-laying vessel with mines on 
board 
8–22 Oct 1987 U.S. sinks three Iranian patrol boats in the Gulf; Iran fires missiles at 
unprotected U.S.-owned tankers; U.S. destroys unused Iranian oil 
platform; Iraq attacks Kuwaiti oil terminal with Silkworm sea-to-sea missile 
26 Oct 1987 President Reagan invokes section 505 of the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 and embargoes all imports from 
Iran, prohibits export of 14 types of potentially militarily useful goods, 
including inboard and outboard motors, mobile communications 
equipment, electrical generators, hydrofoil vessels.81 
14–15 Jan 1988 Iran attacks three tankers in two days 
18 Apr 1988 U.S. blows up two Iranian oilrigs, destroys an Iranian frigate and 
immobilizes another. American warships sink six Iranian vessels 
3 Jul 1988 USS Vincennes shoots down Iranian airliner in the Gulf mistakenly 
20 Aug 1988 Ceasefire begins 
 
From 1980 until 1988, oil shipments through the Persian Gulf were 
targeted by both Iraq and Iran. UN resolutions could not stop the conflict.  When 
other states, such as Kuwait, unwillingly participated in the war, the U.S. joined 
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the debate to prevent Soviet expansion.82 Research on this subject is mostly 
based on Gulf Security and U.S.-led initiatives83; however, this thesis seeks to 
answer, “What are the effects of oil transportation during this war?” Thus, are 
there any opportunities or challenges for Turkey over “free flow of oil” 
phenomena? (Table 1–2)   
C. EFFECTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKET  
During the Iran-Iraq war, each side targeted the other’s oil exports, which, 
in turn, led to international involvement in the conflict. Although, the civilian 
deaths in the Iranian airbus incident and the bombing of civilian population 
centers84 had insightful psychological effects,85 the blockage of consignments to 
international recipients and increased insurance costs in 1986–87 played an 
essential role in ending the war. By comparing the number of tanker ship losses 
in 1984 (15), 1986 (21) and 1987 (7), we may argue that the conflict continued 
until the involvement of the U.S. by the reflagging of Kuwaiti vessels in 1987.86 
Although Reagan’s administration emphasized the free flow of oil as a vital 
American interest, the rejection of arms sales to Saudi Arabia demonstrates the 
limits of defending Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries against a common 
foe.  
Research also shows that eight out of the 411 victim-ships (Tankers: Atlas 
I, Burak M., Buyuk Hun, M. Ceyhan, M. Vatan; Bulk carrier: Mar Transporter, Hira 
III; General dry cargo: Sema G.) belonged to Turkey. Iraqi oil export via land 
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through Turkey and Saudi Arabia during the war continued, although there were 
several incidents by Kurdish groups and the reaction of Iraqi forces against 
them.87 
In March 1987 the United States informed the Kuwaiti government 
of her willingness to escort Kuwait’s 11 tankers through the Gulf, 
provided they would fly the U.S. flag, and a month later Kuwait 
chartered three tankers from the USSR which were put under the 
Soviet flag. By the end of 1987 Iran was confronted with a 
formidable multinational armada of nearly 50 warships.88 
When Iraq declared the northern Gulf (north of 29.03N) a restricted zone 
for all ships that use Iranian ports, the tankers were targeted by Iraqi air forces 
(F-1 Mirage, MIG-23) with Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles. Additionally, the 
introduction of the Super-Etendard increased their range. Iran could not retaliate 
during 1984–86 due to her ineffective air-to-surface missiles which caused little 
physical damage to ships. However, in 1987, Iran deployed Chinese Silkworm 
anti-ship missiles. This important event warned Kuwait to desire outside power 
for protection.89  
The U.S. got involved in the conflict in 1987 by reflagging Kuwaiti vessels 
and taking them under her naval protection, an action that has been named 
Operation Earnest Will. (Table 4–5) Those 11 Kuwaiti tankers were protected 
against Soviet expansionism in the region. Iraq became an ally after mistakenly 
hitting a U.S. naval unit. Thereafter, Iranian oil tankers and naval units became 
targets due to Iran’s confrontation toward all ships in the Gulf, while Iraq was 
targeting only the Iranian side of Gulf.90    
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Year Months Convoys Merchant Ships 
1987 Jul to Sep 10 24 
 Oct to Dec 12 35 
1988 Jan to Mar 20 44 
 Apr to Jun 23 48 
 Jul to Aug 18 30 
 Sep to Dec 44 78 
Table 5.   Operation ‘Earnest Will’ and U.S. involvement into Iran-Iraq War. 91 
The most important findings related to the war are that half of all the 
attacks were made with anti-ship cruise missiles, and the Iraqi missile on-target 
percentage is 80 percent. Sixty-one percent of the victim-ships were tankers and 
only 55 of 239 oil tankers were sunk. This means that oil tankers were actually 
less vulnerable than bulk carriers (39 percent) and freighters (34 percent). 
Tanker War caused a 25 percent decrease in business transport and a quick 
growth in the price of crude oil and did not notably interrupt oil shipments. 
Moreover, Strait of Hormuz has never been closed completely by Iran due to her 
export revenue depending on sea-transportation.92 
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D. RATIONALE FOR TURKEY’S NEUTRALITY DURING IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
“According to Kemalist principles of neutrality, Turkey remained neutral 
throughout the entire Iran-Iraq war and pointedly refused to support the trade 
embargo the United States imposed on Tehran after the hostage crisis.”93 
At this point, Turkey was faced with a war between her two neighbors and 
she had to adopt “a position of strict neutrality, becoming involved only in such 
humanitarian ventures as sponsoring an exchange of prisoners of war (1983) 
and an exchange of diplomats (1984).”94   
From the economical perspective, because of the detention of Iranian 
ports and hindered bilateral trade relations, the largest portion of Iranian foreign 
trade, with the exception of oil, was made via Turkey. For example, in February 
of 1983, two states had an agreement about opening borders for 24 hours 
instead of eight daily working hours. Additionally, volume of the vehicle traffic had 
increased from 600 to 1,200, and profits from the Trabzon and Iskenderun ports 
in Turkey increased.95     
Alternatively, one of the problems during the war years was insecurity for 
Turkish vessels’ passage throughout the Gulf and land transportation of oil via 
the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline from Iraq.96  
During the Tanker War, 411 vessels were attacked and only 239 oil 
tankers were hit. Ironically, the first victim was Atlas I, a Turkish oil tanker at 
Kharg Island that was hit by Iraqi forces.97 Iranians used “heavy caliber machine-
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guns rockets, and missiles designed to attack aircraft or land-based armored 
vehicles,” and thus, the attacks caused “little to no damage to tankers.”98   
Research shows that the Iran-Iraq War was not the first war in which 
merchant ships were trapped in a battle zone. The Six Day War in 1967 is an 
example. Until the Yom Kippur War and the opening of the Suez Canal, ships 
were stuck in the Gulf and were declared to be total losses. However, owners of 
the vessels could not react early to decide whether they should send their ships 
into Gulf, since they did not know when the war would be initiated. For example, 
eighty-three merchant ships trapped in the battle zones had a diverse ownership, 
(India, China, UK, Japan, Cyprus, Greek, Panama, USSR, Honduras, Kuwait, 
Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Singapore, Cuba, Philippines, Italy, Libya, Romania, and 
Maldives) and none of them attempted to participate in the war. The incentive for 
third parties to enter the war was not strong internationally, even though a 
Turkish oil tanker was the first victim of the Tanker War.99 
If we compare the numbers of the major outsider merchant vessels and 
the numbers of the regional Gulf States’ vessels, we may argue that although the 
former is steady, there is an important increase in the latter just before the war. 
Research proves this by showing stability in foreign states (approximately: 
France 1,300, Greece 3,000, India 500, South Korea 1,000, Japan 9,900, Liberia 
2,500, Norway 2,600, Panama 2,700, Singapore 800, Turkey 425, UK 3,300, and 
USA 4,800) and doubled-increase for Gulf States (Bahrain 15 to 37, Iran 135 to 
208, Iraq 56 to 123, Kuwait 172 to 270, Qatar 6 to 33, Saudi Arabia 55 to 172, 
UAE 60 to 111).100 In this regard, although during the war Turkey lost eight out of 
475 vessels, This 1.705 percentage could be taken as a threshold value for 
Turkey to be neutral during a future conflict by sea. 
                                            
98 The Robert S. Strauss Center, “Strait of Hormuz: Military Attacks on Oil Tankers,” The 
University of Texas at Austin, http://hormuz.robertstrausscenter.org/security. 
99 Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping 
During the Iran-Iraq Crisis 1980-1988 (New York: Tauris Academic Studies I.B. Tauris Publishers, 
1996), 33–34. 
100 Ibid., 13–15. 
 41
Another factor was the sharp increase in the insurance rates for the war 
zone. Research shows that, while according to the UN, the  economic embargo 
was strongly effective, the ships traveling toward Iraq, Kuwait and the neutral 
zone of Saudi Arabia were taxed based on both hull and cargo risks. Contrary to 
this, taxation on sailing above 29.45 toward Iran rose to 1 percent and cargo risk 
is not covered, while one tax for sailing toward the Saudi Gulf coast also rose to 
1 percent, but cargo risk is held covered. Additionally, the other increases on 
taxes for other destinations (cargo risks for excluded Iranian ports 0.05, for Red 
Sea destinations 0.0275) show us that there is a speculation in the numbers just 
because of the initial effects of the war. Research also shows that after 
overcoming this shock, the taxes are reduced. For example, for Saudi ports, the 
new rate is established at 0.75 after 12 days.101 
Another side of the war is migration. Many opposition Iranians against 
Khomeini regime were settled in Turkey.  Some of them were loyal to the shah 
and, therefore, they emigrate to the United States and Europe via Turkey. Some 
of them tried to overthrow the clerical regime. In this case, Turkey regulated 
these attempts by sentencing or banishing them. Most importantly, the number of 
the emigrants in the camps increased to 1,000,000, and this brings economic 
hardships.102   
The Kurdish issue is also a problem created by war. Iran pumps up the 
Kurdish groups against the Iraqi government so that she is expected to not only 
weaken Saddam’s military, but also decrease the oil revenues. The Kurdish 
rebellion resulted in attacks on the Kerkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. One can easily 
understand Iraqi Kurds’ attitudes by looking at the scene of armed Kurds tearing 
Saddam’s posters, and Mesut Barzani’s statement on the significance of this 
operation being its closeness to the city center and to the international highway, 
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which is very important for Iraqis. And, beyond that, they have the oil pipeline that 
carries Iraqi oils to Europe.103 Iraqi generals reply these threats by using multiple 
rocket launchers as they have successes in the south. However, “Turkey and 
Iran agreed to announce simultaneously that neither country would allow her 
territory to be used as a basis for insurgency against the others.” The Iranian’s 
attempts to expand their regime toward Turkey, however, were not regarded as 
insurgent.104 
Ankara was the prime beneficiary of the war because both warring 
states developed a high degree of economic dependency upon 
Turkey during the conflict; Turkey was one of their few outlets to the 
west and a source of local goods. In fact Turkish trade with Iraq 
increased by a factor of seven during the war, topping off at some 
$961 million or 12 percent of all Turkish exports.105 
As a result, during the Iran-Iraq War, several lessons were learned. First, 
both Iran and Iraq attacked 411 victim-ships by their land, sea, air forces and 
mines within the Gulf. Although many vessels were hit several times, sharp 
increases in insurance rates did not bring the sea transportation to a halt. 
Moreover, the 23 percent of victim-tankers were sunk or badly damaged, and this 
shows that they are less vulnerable than bulk carriers (39%) and others (33%). 
The weaponry is the most important part of the war, since most of the victim-
ships were hit by Exocet, mines and Silkworms. Although the Iranian National 
Transportation Company underwent a big loss after the war, this was beneficial 
for the transportation market internationally, due to rise in demand.106  
                                            
103 Google videos, “Iran-Iraq War,“ http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-
8979584909588245820#. 
104 Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East Oil, Islam, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001), 173. 
105 Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim 
World (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 40. 
106 Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping 
During the Iran-Iraq Crisis 1980-1988 (New York: Tauris Academic Studies I.B. Tauris Publishers, 
1996), 183–185. 
 43
Another important outcome is that “by 1988 UAE ports such as Dubai had 
become the major transshipment center of Iran, and they maintained this status 
afterwards.” In addition, primary oil exportation is shifted from sea-lanes to land-
based pipelines. Moreover, the war shows us the weaknesses of the ships in the 
danger zone, and thus, this led us to technical research and development in the 
navy for civilian usage. For example, “the need for electro-optical sensors to 
detect aircraft, small craft and floating mines directed the U.S. Navy toward sonar 
modification under the ‘Kingfisher’ program to detect floating mines and the 
“Naval Mast Mounted Sight was developed from a helicopter system for 
temporary assignment to frigates deployed in the Gulf.” And, last but not least, 
“the free flow of oil remains an important Western security interest, and if this is 
threatened, intervention is likely.”107   
E. TURKEY’S ECONOMIC CONCERNS DURING 1980S 
Research shows that there were two major economic issues during 1980s: 
(1) continuation in the Turkey’s external debt (although this chapter’s main 
argument is that Tanker Wars is beneficial for the Turkey’s energy structure and 
future economic profits), and (2) the DECA agreement between Turkey and the 
United States at the beginning of the decade just before the war.  While the 
previous one can be explained as an impact of exchange rates between the U.S. 
dollar and the euro, the latter consists of bilateral U.S. economic and military aid 
to Turkey.108 
The establishment of the DECA agreement between Turkey and the U.S. 
was essential for Turkey’s economy during the war, providing economic and 
military aid to Turkey. The characteristics are:  (a) five-year agreement 
renewable annually, (b) bilateral implementation of NATO, and (c) it is an 
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administrative agreement by not consisting of precise aids. U.S. loans of 
approximately $452 million were made to Turkey for representing the American 
response to the manifest needs of the NATO ally and friend in fiscal year 1981, 
such as other aids to 16 OECD nations of $1.16 billion.109 
“Over the period 1982–88, about $9 billion of the increase in Turkey’s 
external debt can be attributed to changes in cross-currency exchange rates.”110 
On the contrary, Turkey’s internal debt level was steadily 3–8 percent of 
GNP, until the public sale of Turkey’s treasury bills in 1985; then it stayed as high 
as 8 percent of GNP. Unchanged debt gaps and declines in foreign investment 
caused the augmented dependency on domestic sources. As a circle, lack of 
foreign money flows to internal sectors initiated amplified domestic debt. To 
resource this debt, the country lends more money from other sources, and thus, 
fiscal deficits for other resources also increase. The outcome of this circle is 
enlarged debt, since there is no difference between external and internal interest 
rates. Before the end of the war, Turkey’s portfolio of liabilities is not mainly 
dependent on U.S. dollar currency (68% on non-U.S. dollar currencies), and after 
1988, Turkey mainly lends money based on Eurodollar market because of high 
U.S. interest rates. 111  
These two economic concerns during the war guided Turkey’s behavior 
toward her neighbors. While the DECA strengthens Turkey’s fiscal position by 
providing U.S. loans as military and economic assets, the inevitable and 
unsolvable debt circle based on fiscal deficits domestically, combined with the 
currency exchange rates by shifting mainly non-U.S. dollar portfolio to the 
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Eurodollar market. Even though Turkey has lived her “golden age for pipeline, 
which is defined as Turkey’s black gold belt” in terms of Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, 
Turkey has passed through a healing process for her early aforementioned fiscal 
deficits in the 1970s. Thus, it is beneficial for Turkey to earn high profits during 
the war. It is also true to say that it had a minor effect on the real economy due to 
the monetary gap and other loans.112  
F. CONCLUSION 
The Iran-Iraq War during 1980–88 is an excellent case study to 
understand the behaviors of the states during the conflict in the sense of energy 
security. These two neighbors tried to capture each other’s essential oil fields 
and infrastructures from the beginning to the end of the war. While Iraq seemed 
to be successful in the beginning, the aforementioned chronology proves that 
Iran actually had the advantage, according to four peace attempts by Iraq and 
rejections by Iran. 
Since energy security is the primary concern for both sides, the Iranians’ 
two key attempts were very effective. One of them was closing the Syrian 
pipeline. Secondly, Kurdish rebellions in the north cut oil revenue coming in via 
Turkey to Iraq. However, the Iraqi administration in that era was successful also 
in establishing a blockage through Exocet missiles against Iranian tankers. This 
thesis argues that this is the turning point for the war, since Iranian attacks 
affected all states and provided an insecure environment to threatened third 
parties’ interests. 
At this point, Turkey had continued her relations with both her neighbors 
without involving in the conflict. However, Turkey has deficits on revenues 
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coming from both land and sea transportation. The aforementioned tipping point 
for Turkey to enter a conflict over a naval dispute is 1.7 percent. Additionally, the 
incentive for third parties to intervene is not so strong, according to evidence 
gathered from Yom Kippur and Tanker War. The war also caused a diminishing 
faith for the Gulf States’ merchant fleets, because there was an increase in the 
number of the Gulf vessels before the war, and the war stopped this progress.  
These two neighbors also caused a weakness for another neighbor, which 
is Kuwait, but the U.S., with her second-largest merchant fleet, reflagged 
Kuwait’s vessels and this shifted the course of the war. Sharing Kuwaiti ships 
between the U.S. and the USSR appeared to be the key point to deter Iran and 
Iraq military engagement. Thus, it seems that the effort to control the oil outcome 

















Turkey is a country that has the most important role as an energy hub to 
balance demand and supply sides through a reliable energy bridge. However, 
reliability is derived from “high trust,” and trust is coming from the Turkish 
historical neutrality and her strong posture. Issues related to energy security, are 
primary concerns for reliable and affordable energy sources. Turkey, positioned 
between consumers and suppliers, is most affected by the transportation phase 
of energy security. Recent attempts toward themilitarization of energy resources, 
have also provided more insights for Turkey. Does Turkey have experience with 
this issue? In the near future, what are the main concerns about Turkey’s energy 
security structure, and what challenges are we confronting? 
By analyzing the Turkish experience from the 1940s to 1980s, with the 
usage of energy as a political tool, this thesis identified four major findings: (1) 
the non-conflict zone or preparation phase (1940–90), and conflict zone (after 
1980), are two distinct periods related to Turkey’s treatment of energy security; 
(2) Turkey managed to establish good relations with both consumers and 
suppliers during the preparation phase; (3) the 1973 oil price shock, and Turkey’s 
domestic economic conditions, guided and shaped her policies during the 1980s; 
and  (4) during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988),Turkey managed to protect her 
neutrality, while her naval assets were affected negatively, whichbenefitted her 
land transportation and pipelines. 
During  the 1960s and 1980s, the preparation phase sought to balance 
both buyers and sellers, and provided a fundamental readiness for the future. 
The non-conflict zone included the establishment of two memberships (OPEC via 
OIC and IEA), one usage of oil price as leverage (1973 oil price shock), and the 
targeting of energy assets during tanker wars (1980–88 Iran-Iraq War). Three 
general lessons emerged from these cases: (1) Turkey managed to balance the 
energy market by pursuing successful compromise policies; (2) domestic needs 
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provided  an essential role in forming these policies, instead of transit fees and 
international concerns; and (3) although tanker wars harmed Turkey’s naval 
transportation, they were  beneficial to Turkey’s land-transportation, because 
they were the only outlet for both neighboring producer countries.  
Prior to the 1980s, Turkey attempted to balance her western-oriented 
political agenda with her eastern-oriented economic necessities. Politically, in 
contrast to her Arab neighbors, Turkey actively supported and sought alliance 
with the Western powers, resulting membership into NATO, and eventually in the 
IEA. Economically, Turkey’s almost complete dependence on Arab oil forced the 
pursuit of an economic policy that was at odds with her political agenda. The 
internal economic conditions, such as a high level of dependence on oil as 
energy assets, combined with unaffordable levels of debt and low levels of 
strategic energy reserves, forced Turkey to pursue close relations with oil- 
producing countries. The seemingly incompatible policies forced Turkey to 
balance between the two blocs, maintaining a difficult neutrality throughout the 
political, economic, and military crises of the period.  
Despite neutrality, Turkey saw militarization of energy indirectly during the 
Iran-Iraq War. Loss of naval assets and threats to her energy posture prompted 
diversification efforts in order to build better energy security in the next decade. 
The increased transit fee on oil imported from Iraq and goods from Iran were a 
few of the benefits of the war. As a result, Turkey overcame her debt crisis and 
became the sole means of energy export for Iran and Iraq.  Based on her 
neutrality and Iranian and Iraqi dependence, Turkey was able to maintain the 
balance between her economic needs and her political agenda from a position of 
greater strength. 
In summation, post-World War II Turkey has pursued a political agenda 
that has aligned with the West, both militarily and politically. Economically, 
however, Turkey is closely tied to, and in some cases, dependent on non-
Western regional states. Turkey has balanced two blocs through sustaining her 
neutrality in the face of political and economic crisis.  
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The results of the analysis presented here assisted decision makers in 
assessing future prospects for energy security and finding solutions to tackle the 
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